haku: @author Mella-Barral, P. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 2 / 3
Tekijä: | Fries, S. Mella-Barral, P. Perraudin, W. |
Otsikko: | Optimal bank reorganization and the fair pricing of deposit guarantees |
Lehti: | Journal of Banking and Finance
1997 : APR, VOL. 21:4, p. 441-468 |
Asiasana: | BANKS BUSINESS CLOSURE DEPOSIT INSURANCE |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | This article studies a series of different possible closure rules and subsidy policies that bank regulators may apply. The article derives the optimal closure rule of a social-planner regulator that balanced the slump-sum costs of bankruptcy against the costs of monitoring a bank that continues to operate. In certain sircumstances the authorities will wish to postpone closure of the bank until after the point at which equity-holders are willing to keep the bank liquid by injecting capital. Subsidy policies are examined that keep the bank operating even when equity-holders are disinclined to inject more capital. The article also examines the impact of subsidy policies on moral hazard problems in particular asset substitution by the bank's mangers or equity-holders. |
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