haku: @author Amacher, G. S. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 2 / 3
| Tekijä: | Amacher, G. S. Malik, A. S. |
| Otsikko: | Instrument choice when regulators and firms bargain |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
1998 : MAY, VOL. 35:3, p. 225-241 |
| Asiasana: | ENVIRONMENT COMPANIES MODELS BARGAINING REGULATIONS TAXATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In the paper, outcomes are compared with an emissions tax and an emissions standard when a firm and regulator engage in cooperative bargaining over the stringency of the regulation. Bargaining is motivated by giving the firm a choice of abatement technologies. If the firm's preferred technology differs from the regulator's, the first-best outcome is not an equilibrium of the traditional non-cooperative game in which the regulator is a Stackelberg leader. The regulator may therefore choose to offer the firm a more lenient regulation if it agrees to switch technologies. It is found that the resulting bargaining outcomes differ for a tax and a standard even though information is symmetric. Also conditions are identified under which each instrument yields lower social costs. |
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