haku: @author Fishman, M. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 1 / 3
« edellinen | seuraava »
Tekijä:DeMarzo, P.
Fishman, M.
Hagerty, K.
Otsikko:The optimal enforcement of insider trading regulations
Lehti:Journal of Political Economy
1998 : JUN, VOL. 106:3, p. 602-632
Asiasana:INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS
ECONOMICS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:Regulating insider trading lessens the adverse selection problem facing market makers, enabling them to quote better prices. An optimal enforcement policy must balance these benefits against the costs of enforcement. Such a policy must specify (1) the conditions under which the regulator conducts an investigation, (2) the penalty schedule imposed if an insider is caught, and (3) a transaction tax to fun enforcement. The authors derive the policy that maximizes investors' welfare.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 181623
lisää koriin
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA