haku: @author Chiappori, P.-A. / yhteensä: 3
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| Tekijä: | Chiappori, P.-A. Levitt, S. Groseclose, T. |
| Otsikko: | Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
2002 : SEP, VOL. 92:4, p. 1138-1151 |
| Asiasana: | EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS STRATEGY CASE STUDIES GAME THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The concept of mixed strategy is a fundamental component of game theory, and its normative importance is undisputed. However, its empirical relevance has sometimes been viewed with skepticism. The main concern over the practical usefulness of mixed strategies relates to the "indifference" property of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In order to be willing to play a mixed strategy, an agent must be indifferent between each of the pure strategies that are played with positive probability in the mixed strategy, as well as any combination of those strategies. Given that the agent is indifferent across these many strategies, there is no benefit to selecting precisely the strategy that induces the opponent to be indifferent, as required for equilibrium. |
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