haku: @author D'Aveni, R. A. / yhteensä: 3
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| Tekijä: | D'Aveni, R. A. |
| Otsikko: | Dependability and organizational bankruptcy: an application of agency and prospect theory. |
| Lehti: | Management Science
1989 : SEP, VOL. 35:9, p. 1120-1138 |
| Asiasana: | BANKRUPTCY ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Proposed and tested is a new model of organizational bankruptcy based on agency and prospect theory. Debtors with unprestigious top managers, low liquidity and high leverage signal that they will be undependable exchange partners. The model proposes that survival is contingent on maintaining an acceptable, minimum level of these financial and managerial assets. If a firm falls below that threshold level, it has a higher probability of bankruptcy, because creditors withdraw their financial support from the debtor. |
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