haku: @author Ausubel, L. M. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 3 / 3
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| Tekijä: | Ausubel, L. M. |
| Otsikko: | Insider trading in a rational expectations economy |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
1990 : DEC, VOL. 80:5, p. 1022-1041 |
| Asiasana: | INSIDER TRADING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading as often argued. An opposing efficiency argument is formulated by a new model that incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage. If "outsiders" expect "insiders" to take advantage of them in trading, outsiders will reduce their investment. The insiders' loss from diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains. Consequently, a prohibition of insider trading may effect a Pareto improvement. Insiders are made better off if they can perform not to trade on their privileged information. Insider trading is defined and followed by the structure trading stage, investment stage and model modification. |
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