haku: @indexterm Participation / yhteensä: 310
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| Tekijä: | Stegeman, M. |
| Otsikko: | Participation costs and efficient auctions |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1996 : OCT, VOL. 71:1, p. 228-259 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMIC THEORY PARTICIPATION AUCTIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Suppose that risk neutral agents have independently (and perhaps asymmetrically) distributed private valuations for an indivisible object. A mechanism assigns the object, but it is costly to send messages to the coordinator. In these circumstances, the second-price auction has an equilibrium that is classically ex ante efficient, given general opportunities to invest in information about or enhancements of own valuations. In contrast, the first-price sealed bid auction may have no efficient equilibrium, even if buyers are symmetric. |
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