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| Tekijä: | Gropp, R. Vesala, J. |
| Otsikko: | Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring |
| Lehti: | Review of finance
2004 : VOL. 8:4, p. 571-602 |
| Asiasana: | Banking Central banks Deposit insurance Moral hazard |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article examines the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. The model is tested using EU bank level data and it yields evidence consistent with the model, indicating that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt-holders. |
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