haku: @author Lee, S. / yhteensä: 32
viite: 11 / 32
| Tekijä: | Osborne, D. K. Lee, S. |
| Otsikko: | Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking |
| Lehti: | Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
2001 : VOL. 28:7-8, p. 979-992 |
| Asiasana: | BANKING RISK MORAL HAZARD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In cross sections of US banks before the deposit- insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation.-Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. The authors test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. |
SCIMA