haku: @indexterm COMPETITION / yhteensä: 3278
viite: 302 / 3278
| Tekijä: | Thomas, C.J. |
| Otsikko: | Using reserve prices to deter collusion in procurement competition |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
2005 : SEP, VOL. 53:3, p. 301-326 |
| Asiasana: | competition contracts prices |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper discusses collusion in procurement setting and analyses how the buyer's choice of a reserve price influences the sustainability of two previously devised collusive schemes. If the buyer does not select its reseve price strategically, then collusion may be sustainable for a wide range of plausible discount factors. However, even mildly sophisticated reserve price selection can dramatically shrink the set of discount factors for which collusion is sustainable. These findings suggest that buyers are vulnerable to collusion, but they also possess tools that may profitably induce sellers to act competitively. |
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