haku: @indexterm public choice / yhteensä: 34
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| Tekijä: | Edwards, J. Keen, M. |
| Otsikko: | Tax competition and Leviathan |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
1996 : VOL. 40:1, p. 113-134 |
| Asiasana: | COMPETITION INTERNATIONAL TAXATION PUBLIC CHOICE |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government. The two extremes are presented as stark alternatives: the view of government as a Leviathan - from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy-makers - and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens' welfare - from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency. Conditions are derived under which tax coordination benefits the representative citizen. That occurs when policy-makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving. |
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