haku: @indexterm EQUILIBRIUM THEORY / yhteensä: 340
viite: 93 / 340
| Tekijä: | Forges, F. Minelli, E. |
| Otsikko: | A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1997 : FEB, VOL. 18:2, p. 159-175 |
| Asiasana: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR EQUILIBRIUM THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterisation of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. The authors show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self fulfillment. |
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