haku: @indexterm EQUILIBRIUM THEORY / yhteensä: 340
viite: 38 / 340
| Tekijä: | Chatterjee, K. Sabourian, H. |
| Otsikko: | Multiperson bargaining and strategic complexity |
| Lehti: | Econometrica
2000 : NOV, VOL. 68:6, p. 1491-1510 |
| Asiasana: | BARGAINING COMPLEXITY EQUILIBRIUM THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n-person unanimity bargaining name. As is well-known, in this game every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, delays in agreement are also possible in such equilibria. By limiting ourselves to a plausible notion of complexity that captures length of memory, the authors find that the introduction of complexity costs does not reduce the range of possible allocations but does limit the amount of delay that can occur in any agreement. |
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