haku: @indexterm TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS / yhteensä: 37
viite: 7 / 37
| Tekijä: | Lambsdorff, J. G. |
| Otsikko: | How Confidence Facilitates Illegal Transactions: An Empirical Approach |
| Lehti: | American Journal of Economics and Sociology
2002 : OCT, VOL. 61:4, p. 829-854 |
| Asiasana: | CORRUPTION EMPIRICAL RESEARCH COMPANIES TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The author states that since corruption does not allow for legal recourse, corrupt contracts are not legally enforceable. This is why corruption can go hand in hand with opportunism, reneging, and threats of denunciation. There is empirical evidence that investors' confidence is not only adversely affected by corruption but also by the lack of predictability and confidence that accompanies corrupt deals. However, the positive aspect of this lack of confidence is that it acts as a deterrent to corruption. Empirical data provided here on a cross-section of countries proves that confidence in corrupt deals enhances the further spread of corruption. This suggests that the adverse effects of corruption cannot be avoided by divesting it of its unpredictability. |
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