haku: @indexterm capital budgeting / yhteensä: 390
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| Tekijä: | Bernardo, A. E. Cai, H. Luo, J. |
| Otsikko: | Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Economics
2001 : SEP, VOL. 61:3, p. 311-344 |
| Asiasana: | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION CAPITAL BUDGETING COMPENSATION INVESTMENT MORAL HAZARD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for decentralized firms when division managers have an incentive to mispresent project quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing effort. The authors show that in the optimal mechanism firms always underinvest in capital relative to a naive application of the net present value (NPV) rule. |
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