haku: @author Nyarko, Y. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 3 / 4
| Tekijä: | Nyarko, Y. |
| Otsikko: | Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games |
| Lehti: | Economic Theory
1994 : VOL. 4:6, p. 821-841 |
| Asiasana: | BAYESIAN STATISTICS LEARNING GAMES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Consider an infinitely repeated normal form game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other player of the game. Impose only two conditions on the behaviour of the players. First, impose the Savage (1954) axioms, i.e., each player has some beliefs about the evolution of the game and maximizes its expected payoffs at each date given those beliefs. Second, suppose that any event which has probability zero under one player's beliefs also has probability zero under the other player's beliefs. The author shows that under these two conditions limit points of beliefs and of empirical distributions are correlated equilibria of the "true" game. |
SCIMA