haku: @author Dutta, P. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 3 / 4
| Tekijä: | Dutta, P. Rustichini, A. |
| Otsikko: | Equilibria in stochastic games |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1995 : OCT, VOL. 67:1, p. 1-39 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS THEORIES GAMES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors study a class of two-player continuous time stochastic games in which agents can make (costly) discrete or discontinuous changes in the variables that affect their payoffs. It is shown that in these games there are Markov-perfect equilibria of the two-sided (s,S) rule type. In such equilibria at a critical low state player 1 effects a discrete change in the environment. In some of these equilibria either or both players may be passive. On account of the presence of fixed costs, the payoffs are non-convex and hence standard existence arguments fail. |
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