haku: @author Jordan, T. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 2 / 4
Tekijä:Jordan, T.
Otsikko:Central bank independence and the trade-off between inflation and output stabilization
Lehti:Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1997 : JUN, VOL. 153:2, p. 367-383
Asiasana:ECONOMICS
INFLATION
STABILIZATION
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper provides a monetary game model in which the short-run Phillips curve depends on the average inflation rate. Three main results are obtained: First, discretionary monetary policy not only leads to an inflation bias but also to an output stabilization bias. Second, a more independent central bank does not necessarily lead to lower output stabilization. Third, there is a lower bound for a reasonable choice of the degree of central bank independence.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 161001
lisää koriin
SCIMA