haku: @author Vroman, S. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 3 / 4
| Tekijä: | Albrecht, J. Vroman, S. |
| Otsikko: | Nash equilibrium efficiency wage distributions |
| Lehti: | International Economic Review
1998 : FEB, VOL. 39:1, p. 183-204 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS EFFICIENCY-WAGE MODELS DISTRIBUTION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper extends the shirking model of efficiency wages by introducing worker heterogeneity with respect to the disutility of effort. Heterogeneity leads a to a problem of adverse selection in addition to the moral hazard problem that is present in the original model. As a result of adverse selection, an equilibrium in which all firms offer the same efficiency wage cannot exist; rather, a continuously differentiable distribution of wages will be offered in equilibrium. |
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