haku: @author Willner, J. / yhteensä: 4
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| Tekijä: | Willner, J. |
| Otsikko: | Policy objectives and performance in a mixed market with bargaining |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1999 : JAN, VOL. 17:1, p. 137-145 |
| Asiasana: | INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION POLICY BARGAINING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The author analyzes a mixed duopoly in which wages and salaries are determined by Nash bargaining and where the public firm's unit costs depend on its objectives. Because of constant returns to scale, welfare maximisation without restriction would eliminate or significantly weaken the private firm. Therefore, the author focuses on constrained welfare maximization, in which case unit costs are normally higher in the public firm. |
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