haku: @author Levine, D. K. / yhteensä: 4
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| Tekijä: | Dekel, E. Fudenberg, D. Levine, D. K. |
| Otsikko: | Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1999 : DEC, VOL. 89:2, p. 165-185 |
| Asiasana: | Equilibrium theory Econometric models Optimization Rationalization |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors develop a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off the equilibrium path. They show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty, and discuss its relationship to other concepts. |
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