haku: @author Qi, J. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 1 / 4
« edellinen | seuraava »
Tekijä:Kanatas, G.
Qi, J.
Otsikko:Imperfect competition, agency, and financing decisions
Lehti:Journal of Business
2001 : APR, VOL. 74:2, p. 307-338
Asiasana:CAPITAL MARKETS
DEBT
FINANCING
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors examine in a Cournot duopoly model the well-known view that short-term capital market debt can control managerial moral hazard. They show that short-term debt does not provide this discipline because of managment's manipulation of the information flow to the market. Shareholders may nevertheless prefer short-term debt because it motivates management to be more aggressive in the product market.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 221190
lisää koriin
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA