haku: @author Egger, H. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 2 / 4
Tekijä:Beissinger, T.
Egger, H.
Otsikko:Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages
Lehti:Oxford Economic Papers
2004 : JUL, VOL. 56:3, p. 437-460
Asiasana:Collective bargaining
Unemployment
Pay
Models
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In most countries unemployment (hereafter as: unempl.) benefits (here as: bens.) are tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. It is shown how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account. The findings are compared for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unempl. compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unempl. bens. system. It is also demonstrated that a reduction of unempl. bens. of those becoming unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 254610
lisää koriin
SCIMA