haku: @author Zhuravskaya, E. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 2 / 4
Tekijä: | Enikolopov, R. Zhuravskaya, E. |
Otsikko: | Decentralization and political institutions |
Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2007 : DEC, VOL. 91:11-12, p. 2261-2290 |
Asiasana: | fiscal policy decentralisation politics institutions |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | It is questioned if fiscal decentralization (hereafter as: fsc-decn.) leads to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth. This paper tests Riker's theory that the results of fsc-decn. depend on the level of countries' political centralization. Analyzed are cross-section and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries over 25 years. Two of Riker's predictions are confirmed by the data: 1. Strength of national political parties significantly improves outcomes of fsc-decn. and 2. In contrast, administrative subordination does not improve the results of fsc-decn. |
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