haku: @author Hviid, M. / yhteensä: 4
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| Tekijä: | Hviid, M. |
| Otsikko: | Risk-averse duopolists and voluntary information transmission. |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1989 : SEP, VOL. 38:1, p. 49-64 |
| Asiasana: | DUOPOLY RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The incentives for risk averse firms to share their private information are considered. It is shown that the introduction of risk aversion in some cases reverses the result in the literature that no such incentives exist. In the literature it is by now well established that Cournot duopolists producing a homogeneous good do not wish to share information about a random element in demand if they are constrained to acting non-cooperatively. Contrary to this view, arguments are provided that the output level of risk averse Cournot duopolists is increasing in the quality of their private information and decreasing in their perception of risk. The effect on profits turns out to be less clear. |
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