haku: @indexterm FINANCIAL REGULATION / yhteensä: 40
viite: 9 / 40
Tekijä:Volpin, P. F.
Otsikko:Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy
Lehti:Journal of Financial Economics
2002 : APR, VOL. 64:1, p. 61-90
Asiasana:Investor protection
Financial regulation
Company control
Shareholders
Company ownership
Italy
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors. The results suggest that there id poor governance, as measured by a low sensitivity of turnover to performance and a low Q ratio, when the controlling shareholders are also top executives, the control is fully in the hands of one shareholder and is not shared by a set of core sharewholders, and the controlling shareholders own less than 50 % of the firm's cash-flow rights.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 234673
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