haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 180 / 415
| Tekijä: | Bomze, I. Weibull, J. |
| Otsikko: | Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability? |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1995 : NOV, VOL. 11:2, p. 173-192 |
| Asiasana: | GAME THEORY STRATEGY DYNAMIC MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A central conception in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionary stable strategy. However, many games of interest for economics have only strategies which meet the weaker requirement of neutral stability. While neutral stability implies Lyapunov stability under the replicator dynamics in pairwise interactions, the authors give here an example in which an evolutionary stable strategy is not Lyapunov stable in a more general context. The authors propose to use instead the notions of (strong) uninvadability and (strong) unbeatability, refinements of evolutionary and neutral stability, respectively. |
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