haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
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Tekijä:Saez-Marti, M.
Weibull, J. W.
Otsikko:Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
Lehti:Journal of Economic Theory
1999 : JUN, VOL. 86:2, p. 268-279
Asiasana:ECONOMICS
BARGAINING
GAME THEORY
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper investigates the possibility to play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do, in the context of Young's bargaining model. Cleverness does have an advantage in some cases.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 193680
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