haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 109 / 415
| Tekijä: | Berck, P. Lipow, J. |
| Otsikko: | Managerial reputation and the 'endgame' |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2000 : JUN, VOL. 42:2, p. 253-263 |
| Asiasana: | Game theory Equilibrium analysis Managers Models |
| Vapaa asiasana: | Bayesian analysis |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines endgame behaviour, specifically the behavior of managers whose primary concern is to retain their jobs. Managers are taken to be of 2 types, good and bad, and only 1 manager is randomly selected as the firm's first-period manager. The manager unobservably chooses the mean and standard deviation of the process that generates his observable performance. The good manager can choose higher values of the mean of the outcome-generating process, for given standard deviation, than the bad manager can. After the first of the 2 periods, the firm's owner must choose to retain or replace her manager based on performance. In an endgame-perfect Bayesian equilibria of this reputation game, a good manager chooses a strategy with minimal standard deviation for a given mean while a bad manager chooses a strategy of maximal standard deviation for a given mean. |
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