haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 39 / 415
Tekijä:Romstad, E.
Otsikko:Team approaches in reducing nonpoint source pollution
Lehti:Ecological Economics
2003 : NOV, VOL. 47:1, p. 71-78
Asiasana:Environmental protection
Game theory
Incentives
Pollution
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:It is technically difficult and costly to monitor nonpoint source pollution. Consequently, most economic instruments directed towards reducing thip type of pollution have focused on circumventing the monitoring problem by focusing on readily observable factors. One difficulty with such approaches is that the incentives may not be consistent with the primary objectives of the policies - to reduce nutrient runoffs. This article aims at identifying under what conditions it would be beneficial to apply more direct incentives for reduced farm field runoffs.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 256360
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