haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 23 / 415
| Tekijä: | Duffy, J. Ochs, J. Vesterlund, L. |
| Otsikko: | Giving little by little: Dynamic voluntary contribution games |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2007 : SEP, VOL. 91:9, p.1708-1730 |
| Asiasana: | information game theory public goods |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Charitable contributions are often done over time, and they are characterized by the donors' freedom to decide how often they want to contribute. Also the donors receive constant information about the level of contributions by others, and this dynamic structure makes it possible for the donors to accommodate their contribution in respect of that of others. This could establish trust, as Schelling (The strategy of conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) suggested, and thereby elevating charitable contributions. Building on Schelling's insight, Marx and Matthews (Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, 327-358) demonstrate that various rounds of contributions may ensure a higher provision level unobtainable in the static setting, but only in case of a discrete, positive payoff jump upon completion of the project. This article investigates these two hypotheses experimentally exploiting static and dynamic public good games. The results show that the contributions are higher in the dynamic game, but this doesn't depend critically on the existence of a completion benefit jump or on donors' possibility of conditioning their behaviour to that of others. |
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