haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 22 / 415
| Tekijä: | Siqueira, K. Sandler, T. |
| Otsikko: | Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2007 : SEP, VOL. 91:9, p. 1800-1815 |
| Asiasana: | delegation game theory public goods terrorism |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Terrorists, elected policymakers, and voters are included in the three-stage proactive game introduced in this article. The game consists of two targeted countries, where a representative voter selects an elected policymaker to decide proactive countermeasures to ameliorate a transnational terrorist threat. Voters' choice is affected by consideration about free riding on the other countries countermeasures and limiting a reprisal terrorist attack. The terrorist, whose attacks affect voters' actions, benefit from the following low proactive countermeasures. The delegation problem where leadership by voters has a detrimental consequence on the well-being of targeted countries, is the reason behind these results. |
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