haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 262 / 415
| Tekijä: | Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, M. |
| Otsikko: | Predictability of economic processes and the Morgenstern paradox |
| Lehti: | Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik
1990 : VOL. 126:2, p. 147-161 |
| Asiasana: | FORECASTING GAME THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper investigates the original Morgenstern paradox which states that a public forecast can be never true (or if so, only by chance) because the forecast itself changes behaviour. It is demonstrated along the lines of Grunberg/ Modigliani (1954) that true forecast is possible if the process of consecutive reactions has a fixed point. A sharpened version of the Morgenstern paradox in the form of a two-person game is also analysed. |
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