haku: @indexterm BARGAINING / yhteensä: 425
viite: 51 / 425
Tekijä:Correa Lopez, M.
Naylor, R. A.
Otsikko:The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: a reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining
Lehti:European Economic Review
2004 : JUN, VOL. 48:3, p. 681-696
Asiasana:Duopoly
Pay
Bargaining
Vapaa asiasana:Cournot
Bertrand
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In the standard model of differentiated duopoly Cournot equilibrium profits are higher than those of Bertrand equilibrium when imperfect substitutes are produced by firms. This article focuses on the composition where costs, here wages, are determined through a process of decentralized bargaining between a firm and its upstream supplier, here labour union. The results show that the relative magnitude of Cournot and Bertrand profits can be reversed when bargaining over costs is accepted.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 256627
lisää koriin
SCIMA