haku: @indexterm COMPANY OWNERSHIP / yhteensä: 496
viite: 40 / 496
| Tekijä: | Roider, A. |
| Otsikko: | Zur Organisation von Unternehmensbeziehungen: eigenständige Unternehmungen, Integration oder vertragliche Vereinbarungen? |
| Lehti: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
2003 : VOL. 73:5, Ergänzungsheft, p. 23-46 |
| Asiasana: | Investments Company ownership Financial theory |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | Grossman and Hart's (1986) property-rights theory has made a substantial contribution to the question why certain transactions are conducted within firms and not in markets. Ever since Coase (1937), the boundaries of the firm have puzzled researchers. Grossman and Hart (1986) address this issue by defining a firm as a collection of non-human asset under common ownership. They study the effect of the ownership structure over asset on the incentives of the parties to engage in relation-specific investments. The present paper extends this theory by studying the effect of long-term quantity contracts in a property-rights framework where only one of the parties invests. Moreover, in contrast to the standard property-rights model, complex contracts are explicitly considered. Nevertheless, it turns out that, even in this extended model, the choice of ownership structure may be important. In particular, this is the case if the investment exerts sufficiently large externalities on the trading partner. In this case, a simple assignment of ownership to one of the parties may have to be combined with a quantity contract which includes a cancellation clause. Finally, the role of the bargaining power of the investor and various extensions of the model are discussed (original in German). |
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