haku: @author Kahn, C. / yhteensä: 5
viite: 4 / 5
| Tekijä: | Kahn, C. Mookherjee, D. |
| Otsikko: | Coalition proof equilibrium in an adverse selection insurance economy |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1995 : JUN, VOL. 66:1, p. 113-138 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS THEORIES ADVERSE SELECTION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors extend the notion of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium to a class of matching games with private information. This solution concept is applied to an adverse selection insurance economy and is shown to yield a unique allocation: the optimal allocation without cross-subsidy. This contrasts sharply with the outcome in alternative institutional settings for negotiations among players, as modeled for instance by the Incentive Compatible Core. |
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