haku: @author Bucovetsky, S. / yhteensä: 5
viite: 4 / 5
| Tekijä: | Bucovetsky, S. |
| Otsikko: | Rent seeking and tax competition |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
1995 : NOV, VOL. 58:3, p. 337-364 |
| Asiasana: | TAXATION FISCAL POLICY COMPETITION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Regional or local governments often appear to favour the interests of those who own land in the region. Here the implications of this sort of policy making are modelled formally. People are assumed perfectly mobile between regions , but are assumed to own land only in the region of their birth. The Nash equilibrium is shown to be efficient if and only if no migration is needed to achieve efficiency. Otherwise, tax competition leads to too little migration. Voluntary interregional transfers will never arise in equilibrium. |
SCIMA