haku: @author Sakovics, J. / yhteensä: 5
viite: 4 / 5
Tekijä:Ponsati, C.
Sakovics, J.
Otsikko:Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
Lehti:Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : FEB, VOL. 12:2, p. 226-244
Asiasana:BARGAINING
GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. The authors show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. They also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 147312
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