haku: @author Legros, P. / yhteensä: 5
viite: 5 / 5
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| Tekijä: | Newman, A. F. Legros, P. |
| Otsikko: | Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1996 : AUG, VOL. 70:2, p. 312-341 |
| Asiasana: | COMPANIES INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state vertification problem. Because incentives vary with an agent's wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently. |
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