haku: @author Gomez-Mejia, L. / yhteensä: 5
viite: 3 / 5
| Tekijä: | Tosi, H. Katz, J. Gomez-Mejia, L. |
| Otsikko: | Disaggregating the agency contract: the effects of monitoring, incentive alignment, and term in office on agent decision making |
| Lehti: | Academy of Management Journal
1997 : JUN, VOL. 40:3, p. 584-602 |
| Asiasana: | MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING INCENTIVES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Using a laboratory design, the authors examined the simple and interactive effects of monitoring and incentive allignment on managerial decisions. Length of term in office was a third independent variable. Results show that incentive alignment was a more powerful mechanism than monitoring for ensuring that agents acted in the interests of owners. An interaction of monitoring, incentive alignment, and term in office revealed that these effects are relatively complicated and deserve further study. |
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