haku: @author Albrecht, J. / yhteensä: 5
viite: 4 / 5
Tekijä:Albrecht, J.
Vroman, S.
Otsikko:Nash equilibrium efficiency wage distributions
Lehti:International Economic Review
1998 : FEB, VOL. 39:1, p. 183-204
Asiasana:ECONOMICS
EFFICIENCY-WAGE MODELS
DISTRIBUTION
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper extends the shirking model of efficiency wages by introducing worker heterogeneity with respect to the disutility of effort. Heterogeneity leads a to a problem of adverse selection in addition to the moral hazard problem that is present in the original model. As a result of adverse selection, an equilibrium in which all firms offer the same efficiency wage cannot exist; rather, a continuously differentiable distribution of wages will be offered in equilibrium.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 178334
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