haku: @freeterm Tax competition / yhteensä: 5
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| Tekijä: | Conconi, P. Perroni, C. Riezman, R. |
| Otsikko: | Is partial tax harmonization desirable? |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2008 : FEB, VOL. 92:1-2, p. 254-267 |
| Asiasana: | models taxation |
| Vapaa asiasana: | tax competition commitment partial coordination |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper uses a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions: Governments 1. engage in tax competition, being tempted to lower capital tax rates. 2. are not able to commit to future policies and, after capital installation, have incentives to increase taxes. There are three possible tax harmonization (here as: t-h.) scenarios compared: no t-h., global t-h., and partial t-h. It is shown that, if capital is sufficiently mobile, partial t-h. benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization scenarios. |
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