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| Tekijä: | Young, H.P. |
| Otsikko: | On the limits to rational learning |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
2002 : APR, VOL. 46:4-5, p. 791-799 |
| Asiasana: | Learning Rationality Equilibrium analysis |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper summarizes recent work of Foster and Young (2001), showing that some games are unlearnable in principle by perfectly rational players. That is, under any learning rule, incl. Bayesian updating of common priors, the players' strategies fail to come close to Nash equilibrium with probability one. Furthermore at least one of them is unable to predict the behaviour of the other in an asymptotic sense. This result can be interpreted as an "uncertainty principle" that applies to some kinds of interactive learning problems. |
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