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| Tekijä: | Gillette, A.B. Noe, T.H. Rebello, M.J. |
| Otsikko: | Board structures around the world: an experimental investigation |
| Lehti: | Review of finance
2008 : VOL. 12:1, p. 93-140 |
| Asiasana: | board of directors decision making equilibrium analysis models Europe USA |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper models and experimentally examines the board structure-performance relationship in single-tiered (here as: 1-t'd.), two-tiered (as: 2-t'd.) boards, insider-controlled (as: i-c'd.), and outsider-controlled (as: o-c'd.) boards. It is found that even i-c'd. boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred (here as: i-pref'd.) rather than self-interested policies (as: polcs.). 2-t'd. boards adopt i-pref'd. polcs. more frequently but tend to destroy value by being too conservative. O-c'd., 1-t'd. boards ... adopt institutionally preferred polcs. most frequently. In those board designs with the efficient Nash equilibrium producing strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria. |
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