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| Tekijä: | Nyborg, K. G. Rydqvist, K. Sundaresan, S. M. |
| Otsikko: | Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions |
| Lehti: | Journal of Political Economy
2002 : APR, VOL. 110:2, p. 394-424 |
| Asiasana: | BIDDING TREASURY BILLS AUCTIONS SWEDEN |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, the authors document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, the authors find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's curse-driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in the authors' data set use much richer bidding strategies. The paper provides a substantial list of references on this subject. |
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