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| Tekijä: | Tadelis, S. |
| Otsikko: | The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism |
| Lehti: | Journal of Political Economy
2002 : AUG, VOL. 110:4, p. 854-882 |
| Asiasana: | Life cycles Social psychology Human resource management Economic theory |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The author investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium model with moral hazard and adverse selection generates two main results. (1.) incentives of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless" with a market for reputations. (2.) good reputations cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot outbid lesser ones in the market for good reputations. |
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