haku: @indexterm ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY / yhteensä: 550
viite: 94 / 550
| Tekijä: | Windsperger, J. |
| Otsikko: | Transaktionsspezifität, Reputationskapital und Koordinationsform |
| Lehti: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1996 : VOL. 66:8, p. 965-978 |
| Asiasana: | INVESTMENT TRANSACTION COSTS CONTRACTS CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | The aim of the paper was to extend the Williamsonian governance structure approach concerning the influence of specific investments and reputation capital upon the design of coordination mechanism. First, we showed that under symmetric specific investments the transactions are coordinated by implicit contracts because the agents interact cooperatively to realize the relationship-specific quasi rents. On the other hand, under asymmetric specific investments the transactions are coordinated by internal governance structures, if the holdup loss of the more dependent transactor exceeds the internal coordination costs. Second, we showed that the tranactors' reputation capital increases the self-enforcing range of contracts and hence the tendency toward market coordination. |
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