haku: @journal_id 33 / yhteensä: 575
viite: 134 / 575
| Tekijä: | Crabbe, L. Helwege, J. |
| Otsikko: | Alternative tests of agency theories of callable corporate bonds |
| Lehti: | Financial Management
1994 : WINTER, VOL. 23:4, p. 3-20 |
| Asiasana: | TESTS AGENCY THEORY BONDS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | According to agency theories, the prevalence of callable bonds arisis from asymmetric information, a risk incentive or asset substitution problem, or an underinvestment problem. These theories are difficult to distinguish empirically because there are no direct measures of agency costs. Previous studies have found support for agency theories as a group, focusing on whether a bond has a call provision. The authors examine several areas in which the various theories are distinguishable: the subsequent rating changes of the bonds, the distribution of first call dates, the investment activity of bond issuers, and the value of the call options. |
SCIMA