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| Tekijä: | Rutherford, M.A. Buchholtz, A.K. Brown, J.A. |
| Otsikko: | Examining the relationships between monitoring and incentives in corporate governance |
| Lehti: | Journal of Management Studies
2007 : MAY, VOL. 44:3, p. 414-430 |
| Asiasana: | management chief executive officers board of directors corporate governance management control information companies USA |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Agency theory focuses on monitoring and incentives (hereafter as: m-and-incs.) as two solutions to agency problems. It is suggested by research that m-and-incs. may act either as substitutes or as complements etc. It is asserted in the paper that boards' information (here as: brd-info.) and boards' usage of CEO control mechanisms (here as: b-u-of-CEO-c-ms.) are best viewed as complements. Brd-info. gathering behaviour is hypothesized to be positively related to b-u-of-CEO-c-ms. Using primary and secondary data from 149 U.S. firms, it is found that increases in brd-info. gathering are associated with increases in b-u-of-CEO-c-ms. These findings suggest that brd-info. and b-u-of-CEO-c-ms. act as complements in the governance context etc. |
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