haku: @author Krishna, V. / yhteensä: 6
viite: 4 / 6
| Tekijä: | Krishna, V. Serrano, R. |
| Otsikko: | Multilateral bargaining |
| Lehti: | Review of Economic Studies
1996 : JAN, VOL. 63(1):214, p. 61-80 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS BARGAINING REVIEW |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and they authors use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory of bargaining. Game theoretic analyses of bilateral bargaining adopt one of two approaches -- the axiomatic or the strategic. These reflect, for the most part, the normative and the positive aspects of the theory, respectively. |
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